中圖分類號(hào)：G206文獻(xiàn)標(biāo)識(shí)碼：ADOI:10.19358/j.issn.2097-1788.2024.05.010
引用格式：宋彪，閆俊.基于群體參與的網(wǎng)絡(luò)謠言治理模型研究［J］.網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全與數(shù)據(jù)治理，2024，43（5）：69-75，92.

Research on the Internet rumor governance model based on group participation

Abstract： Most of existing studies have found that under strong regulatory measures, online rumors continue to emerge, post-truth mode of information release led to the relevant regulatory agencies unable to keep pace with rumors and tired of dealing with them. Based on the static game profit matrix of both sides, this paper studies the behavior strategy choice of net citizens by using the Evolutionary Game theory, and constructs its dynamic evolution game model. It is pointed out that the mismatch between rumor-making and governance mode is the mechanism of the governance dilemma of Internet rumor. Mathematical analysis proves the effectiveness of group participation in Internet Rumor Governance, and a simple model is proposed to encourage group participation in Internet rumor governance. This paper gives some measures to promote the cooperation of Internet users in rumor governance. This paper provides a new idea for the effective governance of Internet rumors.

Key words : Internet rumor; data governance; Evolutionary Game; government regulation