兩年前的本月，特朗普政府將華為技術(shù)公司列入黑名單，阻止美國(guó)公司向我們出售制造智能手機(jī)和其他產(chǎn)品所需的技術(shù)組件。

　　緊隨其后的是其他限制措施，包括去年采取的一項(xiàng)行動(dòng)，以防止華為從全球最大的半導(dǎo)體制造商臺(tái)灣半導(dǎo)體制造公司（TSMC）購(gòu)買(mǎi)芯片。因?yàn)榕_(tái)灣半導(dǎo)體制造商使用美國(guó)公司的設(shè)備制造其芯片。

　　美國(guó)政府之所以采取這些行動(dòng)，是因?yàn)樗麄冋J(rèn)為，作為一家中國(guó)公司，華為可能會(huì)被迫對(duì)美國(guó)電信網(wǎng)絡(luò)發(fā)起網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊，并有可能從事間諜活動(dòng)。

　　網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全最近占據(jù)了新聞的主導(dǎo)地位。本月早些時(shí)候，美國(guó)總統(tǒng)喬·拜登簽署了一項(xiàng)旨在加強(qiáng)美國(guó)網(wǎng)絡(luò)防御的行政命令，此前勒索軟件攻擊關(guān)閉了美國(guó)最大的燃料管道已有數(shù)天之久。在去年，有黑客通過(guò)Microsoft Exchange和一家名為Solar Winds的IT公司對(duì)美國(guó)政府機(jī)構(gòu)和私人公司進(jìn)行破壞性攻擊。

　　如果拜登的行政命令導(dǎo)致美國(guó)政府對(duì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全采取更基于事實(shí)的方法，那將是一件好事。實(shí)際上，如果與美國(guó)重新接受全球競(jìng)爭(zhēng)而不是繼續(xù)走向貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義相結(jié)合，該命令實(shí)際上可以使美國(guó)和中國(guó)受益。

　　如果拜登政府接受競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，美國(guó)和中國(guó)的公司可以繼續(xù)走上一條通俗易懂的道路，在過(guò)去十年中加強(qiáng)了它們相互交織的經(jīng)濟(jì)。但是，如果拜登總統(tǒng)僅在與美國(guó)的政治目標(biāo)保持一致時(shí)才遵循特朗普的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)方式進(jìn)行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，那么全球經(jīng)濟(jì)將在經(jīng)濟(jì)和技術(shù)脫鉤方面投入大量精力。

　　從短期來(lái)看，將美國(guó)的供應(yīng)鏈與中國(guó)分離會(huì)傷害到一些中國(guó)公司，包括華為，由于黑名單，華為的海外收入去年有所下降。但根據(jù)美國(guó)研究機(jī)構(gòu)Rhodium Group的調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)，隨著時(shí)間的流逝，脫鉤將使美國(guó)損失約1900億美元的GDP損失。同時(shí)還會(huì)對(duì)美國(guó)半導(dǎo)體公司造成損害，因?yàn)檫@會(huì)導(dǎo)致他們的營(yíng)收下降，并削減他們的研發(fā)投入。

　　不幸的是，損害還不止于此。根據(jù)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人智庫(kù)的估計(jì)，如果中國(guó)與澳大利亞，加拿大，新西蘭，英國(guó)和美國(guó)這五眼聯(lián)盟之間的貿(mào)易完全脫鉤，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)損失將超過(guò)50萬(wàn)億美元。

　　甚至美國(guó)政府自己的國(guó)家情報(bào)委員會(huì)也警告說(shuō)，將世界分割成幾個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)和安全集團(tuán)將帶阿里不菲的成本，包括“國(guó)家和公司的巨額財(cái)務(wù)損失，因?yàn)楣?yīng)鏈破裂，市場(chǎng)損失，以及一旦利潤(rùn)豐厚的部門(mén)，例如旅行和旅游業(yè)下降。”

　　美國(guó)方面并非真正與華為競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，這使我們期望，美國(guó)政府選在對(duì)待總部位于美國(guó)以外的華為和其他全球科技公司上面，可能最終會(huì)有所改變。

　　我們了解到，美國(guó)政府正在忙于應(yīng)對(duì)COVID-19，并試圖促進(jìn)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)。但是我們也希望，如果時(shí)間合適，他們會(huì)與我們交談。為了減輕他們對(duì)我們產(chǎn)品和技術(shù)的擔(dān)憂(yōu)，我們準(zhǔn)備接受最嚴(yán)格的控制。

　　我們?cè)敢庥懻撊魏问虑椋ㄔ诿绹?guó)建立制造業(yè)務(wù)，開(kāi)放華為設(shè)備進(jìn)行獨(dú)立測(cè)試，或?qū)⒌谖宕?G技術(shù)授權(quán)給美國(guó)公司或財(cái)團(tuán)。

　　美國(guó)可能希望考慮該公司的首席執(zhí)行官和創(chuàng)始人任正非提出的將華為的5G技術(shù)許可給一家美國(guó)公司的提議。該協(xié)議可能包括華為5G專(zhuān)利的全部或部分，包括軟件源代碼，與制造，網(wǎng)絡(luò)規(guī)劃和測(cè)試相關(guān)的硬件設(shè)計(jì)和技術(shù)。

　　有幾家美國(guó)公司可以采用此方法，可以合理地假設(shè)一兩個(gè)公司可能有興趣了解更多信息。但是，如果沒(méi)有美國(guó)政府的祝福，他們不太可能大聲疾呼。

　　通過(guò)與包括在中國(guó)的國(guó)際技術(shù)公司合作，美國(guó)在增強(qiáng)其全球技術(shù)領(lǐng)先地位方面處于有利地位。我們希望拜登總統(tǒng)不要像他的前任那樣將許多與中國(guó)有關(guān)的不同問(wèn)題聚在一起，以討價(jià)還價(jià)，而是將這些問(wèn)題分類(lèi)，并根據(jù)其優(yōu)缺點(diǎn)進(jìn)行審查。

　　共同努力的人們將建立更美好的未來(lái)。沒(méi)有公司或國(guó)家可以獨(dú)自做到這一點(diǎn)。盡管存在分歧，但美國(guó)和中國(guó)必須找到一種競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與合作的方式。

　　附英文原文：Huawei to Joe Biden: Please talk to us

　　Two years ago this month, the Trump Administration placed Huawei Technologies on a blacklist that blocked U.S. companies from selling us the tech components we need to make smartphones and other products as well.

　　That restriction was followed by others, including a move last year to prevent Huawei from buying chips from the world's largest maker of semiconductors Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. （TSMC）， a Taiwan-based manufacturer whose chips are made with equipment from U.S. companies.

　　The U.S. government took these actions because it believes that as a Chinese company, Huawei could be forced to launch cyberattacks on American telecommunications networks, as well as provide Beijing with the ability to engage in espionage activity in the U.S.

　　Cybersecurity has dominated the news lately. Earlier this month U.S. President Joe Biden signed an executive order aimed at strengthening America's cyber defense following a ransomware attack that shut down America's biggest fuel pipeline for several days, as well as last year's damaging attacks on U.S. government agencies and private companies perpetrated through Microsoft Exchange and an IT company called Solar Winds.

　　If Biden's executive order leads the U.S. government to adopt a more fact-based approach to cybersecurity, that will be all to the good. In fact, the order could actually benefit both the U.S. and China -- if it is coupled with renewed American acceptance of global competition rather than a continuing slide toward protectionism.

　　If the Biden administration embraces competition, U.S. and Chinese companies can continue down a well-trodden path that has strengthened their intertwined economies over the past decade. But if President Biden follows Trump's lead in permitting competition only when it aligns with U.S. political aims, the global economy will extend its headlong rush into economic and technological decoupling.

　　In the short term, separating America's supply chains from China will hurt some Chinese companies -- including Huawei, whose overseas revenues declined last year as a result of the blacklist. But in time, decoupling will cost the U.S. an estimated $190 billion in lost GDP,“ according to U.S. research outfit The Rhodium Group. It will also hurt American companies' leadership in semiconductors and other technologies by shrinking their revenues and forcing them to cut R&D spending.

　　Unfortunately, the damage does not stop there. According to Economist Intelligence Unit estimates, a full decoupling of trade between China and the Five Eyes countries -- Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K. and the U.S. -- would cost the global economy more than $50 trillion.

　　Even the U.S. government's own National Intelligence Council has warned that splitting the world into several economic and security blocs will impose extraordinary costs, including ”massive financial losses for countries and corporations, as supply chains fracture, markets are lost, and once lucrative sectors, like travel and tourism, decline.“

　　Washington's beef is not really with Huawei, but with China, a strategic competitor whose rise could threaten the economic and military primacy America has enjoyed for decades. Although U.S.-China relations may not thaw any time soon, it seems clear that the current administration is taking a more multilateral approach to the world than its predecessor did.

　　This gives us hope that there may eventually be a change in how the U.S. government chooses to treat Huawei and other global technology companies headquartered outside of the United States.

　　We understand that the administration is busy coping with COVID and trying to boost the U.S. economy. But we also hope that when the time is right, they will talk to us. To ease their concerns about our products and technologies, we are prepared to be subject to the most stringent controls.

　　We're open to discussing anything, including setting up manufacturing operations in the United States, opening Huawei's equipment to independent testing, or licensing our fifth-generation, or 5G, technology to a U.S. company or consortium.

　　Washington may want to consider the company's CEO and founder Ren Zhengfei's offer to license Huawei's 5G technology to an American company. The agreement could include part or all of Huawei's 5G patent portfolio, including software source code, hardware designs and technologies related to manufacturing, network planning and testing.

　　There are several U.S. companies that could take this on, and it seems reasonable to assume that one or two might be interested in learning more. But they are unlikely to speak up without the U.S. government's blessing.

　　America is in a strong position to enhance its global technology leadership by collaborating with international technology companies, including those based in China. We hope that instead of lumping together many disparate China-related issues for bargaining purposes, as his predecessor did, President Biden will disaggregate the issues and examine each one on its merits.

　　A better future will be built by people working together; no company or country can do it alone. The U.S. and China must find a way to compete and collaborate despite their differences.